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It is possible to study companies according to their methods of gaining
access to finance, and in particular the stock market. Two approaches are
possible. The first looks at the organisation of such access through the
relationships built up by the company with suppliers of capital, enabling the
financial territory of the company to be defined. The second approach, which
does not exclude the first, is to compare companies according the degree to
which they enjoy access to financial markets, which can be defined in terms of
whether a company is listed on the stock market or not. Both approaches have
been tested using data for recent years. The purpose of this paper is to examine
firstly the differences in access to financial markets between large and small
companies, and secondly the effects and constraints generated by the fact of
being listed (comparison of listed and unlisted companies).
* * *
Comparison of small and large firms highlights a difference in their behaviour according
to size. Small manufacturing companies accumulate at a higher rate and evidence greater
economic profitability that their larger counterparts, along with a higher level of debt (see
Paranque, 1994; Paranque, 1995; Jullien, Paranque 1995; Cieply, Paranque, 1996; Paranque,
1997).
Given this, the central issue is how the requirements of a company's business are
funded. From this point of view companies can be contrasted according to the ways in which
they gain access to sources of finance, and in particular the stock market. Two approaches can
be considered here. The first analyses the organisation of such access through the
relationships built up by the company with suppliers of capital, which enables its financial2
territory to be defined (Belletante, 1991). The second, which does not exclude the first,
compares firms according to the degree of access they enjoy to financial markets, which can
be defined by whether the company is listed or not. Both approaches have been tested using
data for recent years. The work of OFEM [Observatoire Financier des Entreprises Moyennes
- Observatory for Small Company Finance] (Belletante et al., 1994, 1995, 1996) has
highlighted the relationships and financial policies of 104 companies typified by small or
medium levels of market capitalisation (under USD350,000). In addition, analysis of the
effects of market listing has been made possible by the availability of information on "listed -
unlisted" statuses and on the existence of financial links in September 1996 for manufacturing
firms registered with the Balance Sheet Centre of the Banque de France.
1 The sample
examined in 1996 contained 12,044 companies whose 12-month financial years fell within the
period July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1997.
The purpose of this paper is to examine, firstly, differences in access to financial
markets between large and small companies, and secondly, to define the consequences and
constraints entailed by market listing (comparison between listed and unlisted firms).
1 CORPORATE SIZE AND ACCESS TO FINANCIAL MARKETS
A test of independence applied to corporate size (companies with less than 500
employees / companies with more than 500 employees) and listing on the stock market leads
to the rejection of the hypothesis that these are independent. The percentage of small
manufacturing firms listed is 1%, compared with 12% of large companies, the percentage
being 1.5% for the entire sample. If we look only at the listed companies included in the
OFEM study (Belletante et al., 1994, 1995, 1996) we find the same phenomenon. For the
0.4% of the companies studied simultaneously by B. Belletante, the percentage is 0.3% for
small manufacturing firms, against 3.4% for large companies.
2
The existence of financial links is visible for 68.7% of the companies in the sample.
Companies whose capital is held only by private individuals other than those acting for the
company on the stock market and which can be described by the label "general public" have
been excluded. Capital structure can be examined for 85.6% of the companies (58.8% of all
the companies in the sample). Seven categories of shareholder were identified: companies,
banks, holding companies, the State, the general public (stock market), employees and private
individuals. In each case the category was deemed to apply only when the holding reaches a
minimum threshold set at 10%.
Such links are more frequent in the case of the large companies (99.3% compared with
68.7% of the sample as a whole), whereas in small manufacturing firms occurrence is lower
(67.1%), but not negligible. The main differences are to be found in the structure of their
capital. If 10% is adopted as the significant level for equity interests, banks are less frequent
shareholders in large companies (9% compared with 11.4% of all companies for which this
information is available), whose securities are more frequently held by holding companies
(50.3%, compared with 38.7%) or the general public (2.4%, compared with 0.8%). Holdings
higher than 10% in small manufacturing firms are usually in the hands of private individuals
                                                  
1  Using the Banque de France's Observatoire des entreprise database, built up by E. Kremp.
2  OFEM is a set of studies of the financial behaviour of medium-sized firms listed on the stock market and has been
developed by the Lyon School of Management (EM Lyon). Reference is made to the OFEM sample in this paper.3
(29.7% compared with 27.6%), which may reflect the direct holding of equity by the owners
(the managers) of the company.
EQUITY INTERESTS GREATER THAN 10%: BREAKDOWN BY TYPE OF SHAREHOLDER
(%)




Private individuals 27.6 29.6 4.7
(158.321)* (8.9781) (105.63)
Companies 55.3 55.6 50.8
(4.847) (0.1698) (1.9982)
State 0.1 0 1.1
(70.654) - (65,065)
Banks 11.4 11.6 9.0
(3.311)** (0.2299) 2.7045)
Holding Companies 38.7 37.7 50.3
(34.235) (1.645) (19.355)
General public 0.8 0.6 3.4
(53.235) (4.1375) 48.68)
Employees 0.3 0.3 0
(not significant) - -
Source and table: Banque de France
Observatoire des Entreprises - Tel.: 33+ (0)1.42.92.56.58 Last update 11/97
(1)  Interpretation: of those companies with financial links and for which the shareholding structure is known (respectively 68.7% and 58.8% of
the complete sample), 27.6% have private individuals as shareholders holding at least 10% of their equity. This percentage is 29.6% for
small manufacturing firms alone, compared with 4.7% of large companies.
In brackets: chi-squared and contribution to each sub-population.
* = 5% threshold
* = 10% threshold
Where listed companies are concerned, analysis of equity interests of more than 10%
demonstrate the importance of holding companies (53.7% compared with 38.7%), the general
public (27.2%, but only 0.8% of the whole), and finally banks (20.4% compared with 11.4%).
These characteristics are more marked in the case of OEFM companies with middling market
capitalisation, the ranking being, in order of size, 61.7% of securities held by holding
companies, 46.8% by the public (private investors) and 25.5% by banks.
These results confirm those of the study of the behaviour of small to medium
enterprises with access to the stock market (Belletante, Desroches, 1993). Firstly, market
listing leads to the putting in place of structures of holding type as vehicles for the equity
interests of those running the company and their families (92% of the holding companies in the
OFEM sample); the direct holding of securities are the exception here and is in fact statistically
insignificant. Secondly, past experience of small French companies listed on the market clearly
demonstrates that their managers are not unwilling to issue stock to the general public at high
levels of volume, and that they do not limit such issues to the minimum for obtaining listed
status (10% on the French secondary market for example). This reflects a wish on the part of
the senior management of small to medium enterprises to create a wide shareholding base.4
EQUITY HOLDINGS OF OVER 10% BY SHAREHOLDER CATEGORY












Holding Companies 53.7 61.7
(14.4/8.6498) (10.594/6.4554)
General public 27.2 46.8
(1336.3/1248.2) (1277.745/1259.2)
Employees 0 0
Source and table: Banque de France
Observatoire des Entreprises - Tel.: 33+ (0)1.42.92.56.58 Last update 11/97
In brackets: chi-squared and contribution to the sub-population.
What then are the economic and financial features which firms with access to the
financial markets possess, and which other companies do not? In other words, what
constraints are likely to be entailed for small to medium manufacturing firms by the need to
comply with the expectations of the stock market?
2. GROWTH, FUNDING REQUIREMENTS AND PERFORMANCE
In 1996, companies did not create more jobs if they were listed or unlisted ￿
employment grew by approximately 1.8% in both categories 
3. This lack of difference is also to
be seen in the rate of growth in corporate turnover (up 1.8%) and value-added (up 2.4%).
This characteristic holds constantly true for all companies, whether listed or unlisted, where
these are present over the entire period 1989 to 1996 (4,618 companies in each year), a fact
which makes it possible to bring out clearly that the flotation of a company on the French
stock market is neither beneficial nor detrimental to employment, thus militating against the
idea that listed companies decide more often than others in favour of "capital" and against
"labour". On the other hand, it also invalidates the argument that the strengthening of
shareholders' equity by market valuation has a positive impact on jobs.
This observation has already been made in 1995 for SMEs listed in France (Belletante
et al., 1996). Based on the concept of corporate responsibility, measuring changes in size of
the workforce managed by given companies, it was noted that 64% of all listed SMEs
increased their corporate responsibility between 1990 and 1994, with companies in the OFEM
panel increasing the number of employees by a median of 50  (the mean being 98). It is
therefore a significant reflection on market behaviour that listing has not harmed jobs and that
the increase in the managed workforce has led to no deterioration in economic or stock market
performance.
                                                  
3 A test for unequal means was verified by a non-parametric median test at a threshold of 5%.5
EMPLOYMENT AND ACCUMULATION % 1996
Companies Unlisted Listed All
Variation in size of workforce 1.6 1.1 1.5
Variation in corporate turnover 1.8 2.7 1.8
Variation in value-added 2.4 1.1 2.4
Accumulation rate 11.9 9.0 11.9
Displacement rate 4.1 4.2 4.1
Period covered by working capital requirements 69.2 days 92.2 days 69.5 days
Source and table: Banque de France
Observatoire des Entreprises - Tel.: 33+ (0)1.42.92.56.58 Last update 11/97
Bold figures indicate statistically significant values.
The accumulation rate
4, expressing the effort made to strengthen productive potential,
is higher in unlisted (11.9%) than in listed companies (9%) despite the fact that the
displacement rate
5 is similar, underscoring the existence of a policy of investment in equipment
replacement and/or productivity rather than in increased production capacity. Overall, funding
requirements seem to be different, especially given that the period covered by working capital
requirements is longer for listed firms (92.2 days) than for the others (69.2 days). It should be
noted that this period increases in SMEs following market flotation (Belletante, Desroches,
1993). This a direct consequence of market listing. Firstly, customers have the advantage of
better information on the listed firms supplying them (due to public disclosure requirements),
and secondly, the management of listed SMEs observe that their customers exert more
pressure on them after market flotation. This increase in the period covered by working capital
requirements has frequently been mentioned as one of the disadvantages of gaining access to
financial markets in the case of SMEs.
Small Manufacturing Firms Large Companies
Unlisted Listed Unlisted Listed
Variation in size of workforce 1.6 2.1 - 0.1 - 0.6
Variation in corporate turnover 1.8 3.1 1.2 2.0
Accumulation rate 12.0 9.2 9.5 8.6
Displacement rate 4.1 4.6 3.7 3.6
Period covered by working capital requirements 69.4 98.9 64.0 81.4
Source and table: Banque de France
Observatoire des Entreprises - Tel.: 33+ (0)1.42.92.56.58 Last update 11/97
While the listed small to medium manufacturing firms certainly appear to be growth-
oriented compared to large firms, their accumulation pattern is nevertheless closer to that of
large firms than it is to the other companies with less than 500 employees.
The OFEM studies of listed SMEs (Belletante et al., 1994, 1995, 1996) show very
clearly that companies which have opted for listing on the stock market do not invest at the
level of unlisted SMEs. They prefer productivity to expansion of productive potential and in
that respect their behaviour is not dissimilar to that of large companies. Interviews with the
managers of listed SMEs highlight two main causes of this potential braking effect on
investment. The first is the existence of a desire to reduce debt levels (very much a trend in all
listed French SMEs), this being seen as necessary by managers since it is expected by the stock
market. The second relates to the prudential behaviour of managers: they are not certain of the
real level of profitability of their supplementary investment plans, either for reasons intrinsic to
the projects concerned, or because of uncertainty as to future developments in the general
                                                  
4 Accumulation rate = productive investment / tangible fixed assets, including assets acquired under leasing
arrangements.
5 Displacement rate  = accumulation rate –  rate of growth in tangible fixed assets.6
economic context. These two explanations illustrate clearly the impact of market flotation on
SME managers as they begin to assimilate the logic of seeking the best valuation of
shareholders' equity.
PROFITABILITY (%)
Companies Unlisted Listed All
Gross economic profitability 12.4 9.5 12.4
Overall balance 4.6 - 1.2 4.5
Gross financial profitability before dividends 11.6 8.3 11.5
Gross financial profitability after dividends 8.6 6.0 8.6
Net financial profitability before dividends - 3.3 2.9 - 3.2





Dividends to self-financing capacity 25.2 37.2 25.4
Self-financing capacity to invested capital 6.5 4.9 6.6
Source and table: Banque de France
Observatoire des Entreprises - Tel.: 33+ (0)1.42.92.56.58 Last update 11/97
(*) Significant at a threshold of 10% and, in brackets, significant frequency at a threshold of 5% (percentage of companies for which the ratio is
above the sample median)
Bold figures indicate statistically observable differences.
The economic profitability
6 of listed firms is lower, as is also their overall balance (i.e.
the difference between economic profitability and extended accumulation rate). This handicap
is also reflected in gross financial profitability, whether one looks at this before or after
dividend distribution. Conversely, the difference vanishes when net figures are considered.
The difference in economic and financial profiles according the size of the firm and
whether it has access to financial markets could confirm the existence of a behavioural
discontinuity related to the methods of financing available. Given this, which is most similar to




Unlisted Listed Unlisted Listed
Value added to invested capital 66.5 40.5 48.0 34.1
Overall cash flow to value added 21.9 21.4 23.5 32.0
Gross economic profitability 12.5 9.1 10.3 11.2
Gross financial profitability 11.7 7.6 9.7 9.5
Total debt to invested capital 22.6 18.4 12.6 14.1
Source and table: Banque de France
Observatoire des Entreprises - Tel.: 33+ (0)1.42.92.56.58 Last update 11/97
Bold figures indicate statistically observable differences at a threshold of 5%.
The contrast is sharp between small manufacturing firms that are unlisted and the other
companies which are listed, whether or not they are bigger or smaller. Notably, a small manufacturing
firm, especially if it is listed, creates more wealth per unit of invested capital than large or listed
companies. Where the other indicators of profitability and yield on shareholders' equity are concerned,
the differences are not significant.
The OFEM studies (1993 to 1996) reveal the remarkable capacity for adaptation to recession
demonstrated by three-quarters of the listed SMEs. The years 1992-1993 were difficult (turnover
                                                  
6 Economic profitability: overall cash flow + extraordinary income/expense / capital employed.
Financial profitability = self-financing capacity / internal financing.
Overall balance = Economic profitability - extended accumulation rate (total investment + variation of working capital
requirements / invested capital).7
shrank by a median value of – 1.7% and investment fell by 18%). This took company managers by
surprise, and low growth combined with shrinking margins were the result. However, by 1994 they had
already got a grip on the situation. From 1994 on, one can observe growth in turnover (median rate
5.9%), and investment (median rate + 7,1%) directed largely at productivity. This is reflected in an
improvement in manufacturing profitability of 16.6% (median). However, financial profitability does
not keep pace with this: its median increase in the OFEM sample is 10.1%. This phenomenon has
occurred in the context of financial structures with less debt and a different accumulation strategy. It is
thus apparent than even if their market valuation is strong, SMEs do not invariably seek to enhance the
yield on shareholders' equity, as the large listed companies seem to do. The explanation for this may be
that the shares are still held, directly or indirectly, by a group of people largely limited to the owners of
the company, who are less interested in short-term increases in value. The ratio of distributed earnings
to self-financing capacity is higher in the case of listed companies than in that of the others, and the
same is true of yield on equity, which is more frequently at a high level. This is even more true of large
listed companies than for small. In the case of the latter, there is no dividend policy as such ￿
dividends are determined largely by their nominal level the year before. The managers of listed SMEs
prefer to build up reserves rather than conduct a policy of proactive distribution of earnings, although
they do all admit the necessity of paying dividends when the company is listed (Belletante, 1995 ;
Belletante et al., 1994 to 1996).
3. CAPITAL STRUCTURE
As is logical, the ratios of internal financing
7, as well as shareholders' equity, to invested
capital
8 are higher in listed companies than for other firms (78.9% compared with 73%, and 40%
compared with 31,5%), no matter what the size of the quoted company. It is therefore clear that the
quotation of the company on a stock market is a factor which increases self-financing capacity, whether
or not the company is a large one. Conversely, only at a level of significance of 10% does any
difference become discernible for the ratio net increase in capital to invested capital, even if this is more
frequently true in listed than in unlisted companies (57.7% of cases compared with 49.9%). The OFEM
studies have also shown that the level of internal financing tends to increase along with the length of
time that the company has been listed. This is due more to the allocation of earnings to reserves than to
the use of the market to obtain capital. Indeed, the management of listed SMEs express genuine
hesitation at the idea of increasing share capital, thus confirming the "pecking order" theory (Myers,
1984; Belletante et al., 1994 to 1996). The studies undertaken show quite clearly that going to the
market for extra share capital is the very last solution to be considered by the managers of listed SMEs
(even if it is a solution they use with greater facility than the managers of unlisted SMEs), and this
despite the fact that they believe it to be a less costly source than loans! This ambiguous attitude on the
part of SME management can be explained as follows:
– only the cost of the operation is perceived and there is a feeling that it is technically difficult
to raise capital on the market,
– dividends paid out are perceived as the only yield on equity,
– reference to remuneration offered by no-risk assets on financial markets is not considered,
– the fear of dilution of power predominates over objective reasoning.
METHODS OF FINANCING %
Companies Unlisted Listed All
                                                  
7 Internal finance: share capital + internal financial reserves (depreciation and provisions in accounts).
8 Invested capital = Internal finance + financial debt (including leasing agreements).8
Internal financing to invested capital 73.0 79.0 73.1
Shareholders' equity to invested capital 31.5 40.0 31.6





Group and shareholder loans to invested capital 4.9 4.3 4.9
Bank loans to invested capital 10.9 7.4 10.9
Equity interests to invested capital 2.4 15.1 2.6
Tangible fixed assets to invested capital 55.2 43.2 55.0
Working capital requirement to invested capital 27.6 25.8 27.6
Investment securities and cash in hand to invested capital 13.9 14.6 14.0
Total debt - leasing arrangements to invested capital 18.2 15.2 18.1
Bonds and equity securities to total debt 0.5 5.7 0.5
Equity loans to total debt 0.4 0.9 0.4
Other loans to total debt 10.9 17.9 11.0
Bank loans to total debt 52.2 39.3 52.0
Short-term bank borrowing to total debt 32.9 34.1 32.9
Commercial paper to total debt 0.1 0.6 0.1
Leasing to total debt 16.9 8.2 16.8
Discounting to total debt 13.5 8.5 13.4
Debt to invested capital 22.2 16.7 22.1
Source and table: Banque de France
Observatoire des Entreprises - Tel.: 33+ (0)1.42.92.56.58  Last update 11/97
(*) Significant at a threshold of 10% and, in brackets, significant frequency at 5% (percentage of companies for which the ratio is higher than the
median for the sample as a whole).
Bold figures indicate statistically observable differences.
There are fairly distinct differences in asset structures. For example, the ratio of equity
interests to invested capital is higher and the percentage share of plant and equipment is lower
in listed companies. Conversely, there does not appear to be any significant difference in the
ratios to invested capital of investment securities plus cash in hand or working capital
requirement, which reflects constraints related more to the business than to the financial
structure in the management of the operating cycle (see above).
Small Manufacturing Firms Large Companies
Unlisted Listed Unlisted Listed
Internal financing to invested capital 72.7 77.3 80.4 81.6
Equity interest to invested capital 2.1 10.6 8.5 22.4
Working capital requirement to invested capital 27.8 29.3 22.7 20.3
Bank loans to invested capital 11.2 8.5 4.6 5.6





Source and table: Banque de France
Observatoire des Entreprises - Tel.: 33+ (0)1.42.92.56.58                        Last update 11/97
While market listing does not compromise jobs, it may on the other hand orient
investment policy toward financial growth, and this would be even truer of big companies than
small.
Debt levels
9 are higher in unlisted than in listed companies only from 1994 onwards for
companies present since 1989. In 1996, the structure of financial debt differed between the
various categories of company. For example, the percentage of bonds and equity securities is
higher when the company is listed (5.7% of total debt compared with 0.5%), as is that for
equity loans (0.9% against 0.4%), and other loans (17.9% compared with 10.9%) while the
percentage share of bank borrowing is lower (39.3% against 52.2%). In fact, use of the stock
market makes it possible to reduce intermediation, although the share of short-term bank
                                                  
9 Including leasing agreements.9
borrowing is similar from one category to another. It should however be noted, firstly, that
there is greater use of other sources of finance, such as leasing and discounting, in unlisted
than in listed companies (respectively 13.5% and 16.9% of debt compared with 8.5% and
8.2%), and, secondly, group and shareholder loans are at similar levels for both listed and
unlisted firms.
This difference between listed and unlisted companies is brought into sharper focus
when the data are analysed by corporate size. Listed SMEs use the market very rarely to
increase medium and long term debt (bond issues), and virtually never for short term debt
(commercial paper). This very limited use of market funding by French listed SMEs cannot be
explained solely by the tendency to reduce debt which has existed since 1992 (median debt
level in 1992: 68.5%; median debt level in 1996: 49%). The other reasons relate firstly to the
unsuitability of the legal and procedural parameters for the issuing of bonds by SMEs; the
organisational constraints and fixed costs associated with such operations are too high for the
funding requirements of firms of low to medium size and capitalisation. It is very clear
according to French experience of the flotation of SMEs that the ways in which markets
operate need to be adapted to the economic realities of small to medium enterprises. Secondly,
the rarity of use of the market to raise capital (less than one listed SME out of every 10 in the
OFEM sample) can also be explained by total ignorance of how this type of market operates
on the part of the managers of listed SMEs. There is here an evident lack of expertise, and the
managers concerned often criticise their bankers or stockbrokers, maintaining that while they
had provided effective assistance for the initial flotation, they had left the company to its own
devices afterwards (Belletante, Desroches, 1993; Belletante et al., 1994 to 1996). It is
apparent to us that the conclusion to be drawn from this is that if SMEs are to derive benefit
from financial markets and if they are to enjoy financial structures identical to those of large
listed companies, more is needed than simply to facilitate their access to the markets. Despite
facilities of access, the "knowledge gap" (Tamari, 1980; Belletante, Levratto, 1996) remains.
It is the task of those responsible for stock markets and the financial partners of SMEs to help
the latter narrow that gap.
This difference in structure is underscored by mobilisation.
CONCLUSION
While the contrasts between companies sorted by size do not completely align with the
difference between listed and unlisted companies, there are common denominators to be seen
between SMEs and unlisted companies. Specifically, the accumulation rate is higher and
external growth lesser, while debt levels are higher, as are economic profitability and gross
financial profitability. Listed SMEs stand on the borderline between the two behavioural
categories. Although they are present on the stock market, they do not make optimal use of it,
due to:
– lack of knowledge of the ways in which the markets operate, and a perception that
the costs and practical constraints are too burdensome,
– lack of independence between the receipt of financial resources and their
employment: extra funding become available only in conjunction with investment projects,
– the lack of optimal valuation for shareholders' equity because of the absence of use of
leverage effects and unimaginative dividend policy.10
All the above points underscore the observation that there exists a particular logic
related to corporate size and the nature of the relationship with the financial markets
corresponding to specific approaches to development and, by extension, management. Access
to the stock market entails changes in corporate behaviour which must harmonise with the
company's strategy and its capital requirements. Contracting debt or raising capital directly on
the stock market thus relate to mutually incompatible growth choices. What in fact is
important is the capacity of the company, of the SME in particular, to identify the factors
promoting consistency and by extension the dangers deriving from the change in the nature of
the constraints to be managed.
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